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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Michael Dewayne Weathers timely appeals from the district court's order 
revoking probation. On appeal, Mr. Weathers argues that the Idaho Supreme Court 
denied him due process and equal protection when it refused to augment the record 
with various transcripts he requested to be created at the public's expense. 
Mr. Weathers also argues that the district court abused its discretion when it revoked 
probation and failed to sua sponte reduce the length of his sentence 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
Mr. Weathers was charged, by Information, with sexual abuse of a child under 
the age of sixteen. (R., ppAO-41.) The State also filed an Information Part II charging 
Mr. Weathers with a persistent violator enhancement. (R., ppA2-43.) Pursuant to a 
plea agreement, Mr. Weathers pleaded guilty to sexual abuse of a child under the age 
of sixteen and, in return, the State dismissed the persistent violator enhancement. 
(R., pp.70-72.) Thereafter, the district court imposed a unified sentence of seven years, 
with three years fixed, but retained jurisdiction. (R., pp.75-80.) Upon review of 
Mr. Weathers' period of retained jurisdiction (hereinafter, rider), the district court 
suspended the sentence and placed Mr. Weathers on probation. (R., pp.81-86.) 
After a period of probation, the State filed a report of probation violation alleging 
that Mr. Weathers violated various terms of his probation. (R., pp.90-91.) Mr. Weathers 
then admitted to violating the terms of his probation for consuming alcohol, failing to 
report contact with law enforcement to his probation officer, viewing pornography, using 
the internet, and having sexual contact with an adult female. (R., pp.90-91, 97-98; 
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09/19/10 Polygraph Report, p.2.) The district court found that Mr. Weathers had 
violated the terms of his probation, but continued Mr. Weathers' probation. (R., pp.1 06-
109.) 
After a second period of probation, the State filed a report of probation violation 
alleging that Mr. Weathers violated various terms of his probation. (R., pp.113-115.) 
After an evidentiary hearing, the district court found that Mr. Weathers violated the 
terms of his probation for having a non-sexual relationship with an adult woman. 
(12/13/11 Tr., p.166, Ls.12-23.) Mr. Weathers also admitted to violating the terms of his 
probation for viewing pornographic material, being suspended from sex offender 
treatment, and entering an establishment that derived its primary source of income from 
the sale of alcohol. (12/13/11 Tr., p.166, L.24 - p.168, L.1.) Thereafter, the district court 
revoked probation and executed the underlying sentence. (R., pp.144-149.) 
Mr. Weathers timely appealed. (R., pp.154-157.) 
Mr. Weathers also filed a Rule 35 motion requesting leniency, which was denied 
by the district court. 1 (R., pp.152-153, 168-174.) 
On appeal, Mr. Weathers filed a motion to augment the record with various 
transcripts. (Motion to Augment and to Suspend the Briefing Schedule and Statement 
in Support Thereof (hereinafter, Motion to Augment), pp.1-4.) The State objected in part 
to Mr. Weathers' request for the transcripts. (Objection in Part to "Motion to Augment 
and to Suspend the Briefing Schedule and Statement in Support Thereof" (hereinafter, 
Objection to Motion to Augment), pp.1-4.) Thereafter, the Idaho Supreme Court entered 
an order granting Mr. Weather's request for two transcripts, but denying his request for 
transcripts of the rider review hearing, held on January 11, 2010, the admit/deny 
1 Mr. Weathers is not challenging the denial of his Rule 35 motion on appeal. 
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hearing, held on October 26, 2010, and the disposition hearing, held on February 2, 
2011. (Order (hereinafter, Order Denying Motion to Augment), pp.1-2.) 
3 
ISSUES 
1. Did the Idaho Supreme Court deny Mr. Weathers due process and equal 
protection when it denied his Motion to Augment with the requested transcripts? 
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it revoked Mr. Weathers' 
probation? 
3. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it failed to reduce Mr. Weathers' 
sentence sua sponte upon revoking probation? 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
The Idaho Supreme Court Denied Mr. Weathers Due Process And Equal Protection 
When It Denied His Motion To Augment The Appellate Record With Necessary 
Transcripts 
A. Introduction 
A long line of United States Supreme Court cases hold that it is a violation of the 
Fourteenth Amendment's due process and equal protection clauses to deny an indigent 
defendant access to transcripts of proceedings which are relevant to issues the 
defendant intends to raise on appeal. In the event the record reflects a colorable need 
for a transcript, the only way a court can constitutionally preclude an indigent defendant 
from obtaining that transcript is if the State can prove that the transcript is irrelevant to 
the issues raised on appeal. 
In this case, Mr. Weathers filed a Motion to Augment, requesting a transcript of 
the rider review hearing, held on January 11, 2010, the admit/deny hearing, held on 
October 26, 2010, and the disposition hearing, held on February 2, 2011. The request 
for those transcripts was denied by the Supreme Court. On appeal, Mr. Weathers is 
challenging the Idaho Supreme Court's denial of his request for the transcripts. 
Mr. Weathers asserts that the requested transcripts are relevant to the issues of 
whether the district court abused its discretion in revoking probation, and whether it 
abused its discretion by failing to sua sponte reduce the length of his sentence, because 
the district court could rely on its memory of the requested hearings when it revoked 
probation. Therefore, the Idaho Supreme Court erred in denying his request. 
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B. The Idaho Supreme Court Denied Mr. Weathers Due Process And Equal 
Protection When It Denied His Motion To Augment The Appellate Record With 
The Necessary Transcripts 
1. The Idaho Supreme Court, By Failing To Provide Mr. Weathers With 
Access To The Requested Transcripts, Has Denied Him Due Process And 
Equal Protection Because He Cannot Obtain A Merit Based Appellate 
Review Of His Sentencing Claims 
The constitutions of both the United States and the State of Idaho guarantee a 
criminal defendant due process of law. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; IDAHO. CONST. 
art.I§13. 
It is firmly established that due process requires notice and a meaningful 
opportunity to be heard. Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545 (1965); 
Cole v. Arkansas, 333 U.S. 196 (1948). The Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment also protects against arbitrary and capricious acts 
of the government. Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980). Due 
process requires that judicial proceedings be "fundamentally fair." 
Lassiter v. Department of Soc. Servo of Durham Cty., 452 U.S. 18, 24 
(1981 ). 
State V. Card, 121 Idaho 425,445 (1991) (overruled on other grounds by State V. Wood, 
132 Idaho 88 (1998)). The Idaho Supreme Court has "applied the United States 
Supreme Court's standard for interpreting the due process clause of the United States 
Constitution to art. I, Section 13 of the Idaho Constitution." Maresh V. State, Dept. of 
Health and Welfare ex reI. Caballero, 132 Idaho 221, 227 (1998). 
In Idaho, a criminal defendant's right to appeal is created by statute. See 
I.C. § 19-2801. Idaho statutes dictate that if an indigent defendant requests a transcript, 
the transcript must be created at county expense. I.C. § 1-1105(2); I.C. § 19-863(a). 
Idaho court rules also address this issue. Idaho Criminal Rule 5.2 mandates the 
production of transcripts when requested by an indigent defendant. I.C.R. 5.2(a). 
Further, "[t]ranscripts may be requested of any hearing or proceeding before the court .. 
. . " Id. Idaho Criminal Rule 54.7 further enables a district court to "order a transcript to 
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be prepared at county expense if the appellant is exempt from paying such a fee as 
provided by statute or law." I.C.R. 54.7(a). 
An appeal from an order revoking probation is an appeal of right as defined in 
Idaho Appellate Rule 11. An order revoking probation is an order "made after judgment 
affecting the substantial rights of the defendant." State v. Oryden, 105 Idaho 848, 852 
(Ct. App. 1983). 
The United States Supreme Court has issued a long line of cases that directly 
address whether indigent defendants, who have a statutory right to an appeal, can 
require the state to pay for an appellate record including verbatim transcripts of the 
relevant trial proceedings. There are two fundamental themes which permeate these 
cases. The first theme is that the Fourteenth Amendment's due process and equal 
protection clauses are interpreted broadly. Any disparate treatment between indigent 
defendants and those with financial means is not tolerated. However, the second 
theme limits the states' obligation to provide indigent defendants with a record for 
review. The states do not have to provide indigent defendants with everything they 
request. In order to meet the constitutional mandates of due process and equal 
protection, the states must provide indigent defendants with an appellate record unless 
some or all of the requested materials are unnecessary or frivolous. 
The seminal opinion in this line of cases is Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956). 
In that case, two indigent defendants "filed a motion in the trial court asking that a 
certified copy of the entire record, including a stenographic transcript of the 
proceedings, be furnished them without cost." Griffin, 351 at 13. At that time, the State 
of Illinois provided free transcripts for indigent defendants that had been sentenced to 
death, but required defendants in all other criminal cases to purchase transcripts 
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themselves. Id. at 14. The sole question before the United States Supreme Court was 
whether the denial of the requested transcripts to indigent non-death penalty defendants 
was a denial of due process or equal protection. Id. at 16. 
The Supreme Court initially noted that "[p]roviding equal justice for poor and rich, 
weak and powerful alike is an age old problem." Id. "Both equal protection and due 
process emphasize the central aim of our entire judicial system-all people charged with 
crime must, so far as the law is concerned, 'stand on an equality before the bar of 
justice in every American court.'" Id. at 17 (quoting Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 
241 (1940)). "In criminal trials a State can no more discriminate on account of poverty 
than on account of religion, race, or color." Id. The Supreme Court went on to hold as 
follows: 
There is no meaningful distinction between a rule which would deny the 
poor the right to defend themselves in a trial court and one which 
effectively denies the poor an adequate appellate review accorded to all 
who have money enough to pay the costs in advance. It is true that a 
State is not required by the Federal Constitution to provide appellate 
courts or a right to appellate review at all. But that is not to say that a 
State that does grant appellate review can do so in a way that 
discriminates against some convicted defendants on account of their 
poverty. Appellate review has now become an integral part of the Illinois 
trial system for finally adjudicating the guilt or innocence of a defendant. 
Consequently at all stages of the proceedings the Due Process and Equal 
Protection Clauses protect persons like petitioners from invidious 
discriminations. 
Id. at 18 (citations and footnotes omitted). In order to satisfy the constitutional 
mandates of both due process and equal protection, an indigent defendant must be 
provided with a record which facilitates an effective merits-related appellate review. At 
the same time, the Supreme Court noted that a stenographic transcript is not necessary 
in instances where a less expensive, yet adequate, alternative exists. Id. at 20. 
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In Bums v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252 (1959), the Supreme Court reaffirmed its holding 
in Griffin when it struck down a requirement that all appeals to the Ohio Supreme Court 
be accompanied with a requisite filing fee, regardless of a defendant's indigency. In 
that case, the State argued that the defendant had already received appellate review of 
his conviction by the Ohio appellate court. Bums, 360 U.S. at 257. The United States 
Supreme Court rejected this argument and ruled that "once the State chooses to 
establish appellate review in criminal cases, it may not foreclose indigents from access 
to any phase of that procedure because of their poverty." Id. "This principle is no less 
applicable where the State has afforded an indigent defendant access to the first phase 
of its appellate procedure but has effectively foreclosed access to the second phase of 
that procedure solely because of his indigency." Id. 
In State v. Draper, 372 U.S. 487 (1963), the Supreme Court addressed a 
procedure determining access to transcripts based on a frivolousness standard. "Under 
the present standard, ... they must convince the trial judge that their contentions of 
error have merit before they can obtain the free transcript necessary to prosecute their 
appeal." Draper, 372 U.S. 494. The Supreme Court first expanded upon its statement 
in Griffin, that a stenographic transcript is not required if an equivalent alternative is 
available, by adding a relevancy requirement when stating that "part or all of the 
stenographic transcript in certain cases will not be germane to consideration of the 
appeal, and a State will not be required to expend its funds unnecessarily in such 
circumstances." Id. at 495. The Court went on to discuss the specific issues raised for 
appeal by the defendants to decide the relevance of the requested transcripts. The 
Court ultimately concluded that the issues raised by the defendants could not be 
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adequately reviewed without resorting to the stenographic transcripts of the trial 
proceedings. Id. at 497-99. 
Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189 (1971), extended the Griffin protections 
to defendants convicted of non-felony offenses, and placed the burden on the State to 
prove that the requests for verbatim transcripts are not relevant to the issues raised on 
appeal. In doing so, it was held that a defendant need only make a colorable argument 
that he/she needs items to create a complete record on appeal. Id. at 195. If the State 
wants to deny the defendant's request, it is the State's burden to prove that the 
requested items are not necessary for the appeal. Id. 
This authority has been recognized by both the Idaho Supreme Court and the 
Idaho Court of Appeals. See Gardener v. State, 91 Idaho 909 (1967); State v. 
Callaghan, 143 Idaho 856 (Ct. App. 2006); State v. Braaten, 144 Idaho 60 (Ct. App. 
2007). 
An application of the foregoing rules to the facts of this case creates a situation 
analogous to Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477 (1863). In that case, a transcript was 
necessary to perfect an appeal and the appeal could be dismissed without the 
transcript. Lane, 327 U.S. at 478-81. Similarly, in Idaho, an appellant must provide an 
adequate record or face procedural default. "It is well established that an appellant 
bears the burden to provide an adequate record upon which the appellate court can 
review the merits of the claims of error, ... and where pertinent portions of the record 
are missing on appeal, they are presumed to support the actions of the trial court." 
State v. Coma, 133 Idaho 29, 34 (Ct. App. 1999) (citing State v. Beck, 128 Idaho 416, 
422 (Ct. App. 1996); State v. Beason, 119 Idaho 103, 105 (Ct. App. 1991); State v. 
Murinko, 108 Idaho 872, 873 (Ct. App. 1985); State v. Repici, 122 Idaho 538, 541 
10 
(Ct. App. 1992)). If the transcripts are missing, but the record contains court minutes, 
that may be sufficient so that a "meaningful review of [an appellant's] claim is possible, 
although the Idaho Court of Appeals has "strongly suggest[ed] that appellate counsel 
not rely on the district court minutes to provide an adequate record for [that] Court's 
review." State v. Murphy, 133 Idaho 489, 491 (Ct. App. 1999). If Mr. Weathers fails to 
provide the appellate court with the requested items, the legal presumption will apply 
and Mr. Weathers' claims will not be addressed on their actual merits. If it is state 
action alone, which prevents him from access to the requested items, then suc~ action 
is a violation of due process, as per Lane, and any such presumption should no longer 
apply. 
Whether the transcripts of the requested proceedings were before the district 
court at the time of the probation revocation hearing is not relevant in deciding whether 
the transcripts are relevant to the issues on appeal because in reaching a sentencing 
decision, a district court is not limited to considering only that information offered at the 
hearing from which the appeal is filed. Rather, a court is entitled to utilize knowledge 
gained from its own official position and observations. Downing v. State, 136 Idaho 
367, 373-74 (Ct. App. 2001); see also State v. Sivak, 105 Idaho 900, 907 (1983) 
(recognizing that the findings of the trial judge in sentencing are based, in part, upon 
what the court heard during the trial); State v. Wallace, 98 Idaho 318 (1977) 
(recognizing that the court could rely upon "the number of certain types of criminal 
transactions that [the judge] has observed in the courts within his judicial district and the 
quantity of drugs therein involved"); State v. Gibson, 106 Idaho 491 (Ct. App. 1984) 
(approving sentencing court's reliance upon evidence presented at the preliminary 
hearing from a previously dismissed case because "the judge hardly could be expected 
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to disregard what he already knew about Gibson from the other case"). Thus, whether 
the prior hearings were transcribed or not is irrelevant, because the court may rely upon 
the information it already knows from presiding over the prior hearings when it made the 
decision to revoke probation. 
The Idaho Court of Appeals has recently issued an opinion in State v. Morgan, 
Docket No 39057,2012 Opinion No 38 (Ct. App. 2012) (not yet final), which addressed 
the foregoing argument. In that case, the defendant pleaded guilty and was placed on 
probation. Id. at 1. After a period of probation, the defendant admitted to violating the 
terms of his probation and the district court revoked probation but retained jurisdiction. 
Id. at 1-2. After completing the rider, the district court placed the defendant on 
probation. Id. at 2. The defendant admitted to violating the terms of his probation and 
the district court revoked probation. Id. The defendant appealed from the district 
court's second order revoking probation. Id. 
On appeal, the defendant filed a motion to augment the appellate record with 
transcripts associated with his first probation violation and disposition, which was denied 
by the Idaho Supreme Court. Id. The defendant then raised as issues on appeal the 
question of whether the Idaho Supreme Court denied him due process and equal 
protection when it denied the motion to augment and the issue of whether the district 
court abused its discretion when it revoked probation. Id. at 2-3. The Idaho Court of 
Appeals held that the transcripts of the prior probation proceedings were not necessary 
for the appeal because "they were not before the district court in the second probation 
violation proceedings, and the district court gave no indication that it based its 
revocation decision upon anything that occurred during those proceedings." Id. at 4. 
While Morgan does directly deal with the issues raised in this appeal, at this point 
12 
this case is not final. Moreover, it is distinguishable because Mr. Weathers is 
challenging not only the order revoking probation, but also the length of his sentence, 
which entails an analysis of the district court's sentencing rationale. 
Additionally, the requested items are within an Idaho appellate court's scope of 
review. The requested transcripts are relevant because Idaho appellate courts review 
all proceedings following sentencing when determining whether the court made 
appropriate sentencing determinations. See State v. Hanington, 148 Idaho 26, 
28 (Ct. App. 2009) ("When we review a sentence that is ordered into execution following 
a period of probation, we will examine the entire record encompassing events before 
and after the original judgment. We base our review upon the facts existing when the 
sentence was imposed as well as events occurring between the original sentencing and 
the revocation of probation." (emphasis added)).2 
Further support for Mr. Weathers' position can be found in State v. Warren, 123 
Idaho 20 (Ct. App.1992). In that case, Mr. Warren was convicted of aggravated battery 
2 In Morgan, supra, the Court of Appeals clarified the scope of review articulated in 
Hanington. Specifically it held: 
In reviewing the propriety of a probation revocation, we will not arbitrarily 
confine ourselves to only those facts which arise after sentencing to the 
time of the revocation of probation. However, that does not mean that all 
proceedings in the trial court up to and including sentencing are germane. 
The focus of the inquiry is the conduct underlying the trial court's decision 
to revoke probation. Thus, this Court will consider the elements of the 
record before the trial court relevant to the revocation of probation issues 
which are properly made part of the record on appeal. 
Morgan, at 4. (original emphasis). As stated above, Morgan is not a final opinion and 
Mr. Weathers is raising a sentencing claim in this appeal. 
13 
in 1988 and placed on probation. Id. at 21. Mr. Warren's probation was then revoked 
and the district court retained jurisdiction for 180 days. Id. After completing the period 
of retained jurisdiction, Mr. Warren was placed on another period of probation, which 
was ultimately revoked. Id. The district court then sua sponte reduced the length of 
Mr. Warren's sentence. Id. Mr. Warren then appealed and alleged that the district court 
should have further reduced the length of his sentence. Id. In support of that position, 
Mr. Warren argued that his probation violation was trivial. Id. The Court of Appeals 
addressed that argument stating "Warren incorrectly points to the nature of the 
probation violation by arguing that his violation was trivial. This Court must look at the 
nature of the original criminal offense, in this case aggravated battery where Warren bit 
off his victim's ear." Id. However, the Court of Appeals did not address the merits of his 
sentence reduction claim because Mr. Warren had failed to provide a transcript of the 
original PSI and a transcript of the original sentencing hearing. Id. Even though the 
original sentence was not on appeal, and happened years before the decision at issue, 
the Idaho Court of Appeals held that the transcript was necessary to address 
Mr. Warren's claims of error. Moreover, there was no indication that a transcript of that 
hearing was created before the probation violation hearing or that the district court 
referenced the original sentencing hearing at the probation violation disposition hearing. 
It appears that the Court of Appeals assumed that the original sentencing hearing would 
address the nature of the original offense. Had Mr. Weathers failed to request the 
transcripts at issue, the Warren opinion indicates that they would be presumed to 
support the district court's decision to execute the original sentence. 
In sum, there is a long line of cases which repeatedly hold it is a violation of both 
due process and equal protection to deny indigent defendants transcripts of trial 
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proceedings on appeal. The decision to deny Mr. Weathers' request for the transcripts 
will render his appeal meaningless because it will be presumed that the missing 
transcripts support the district court's sentencing decisions. This functions as a 
procedural bar to the review of Mr. Weathers' appellate sentencing claims on the merits, 
and therefore, Mr. Weathers should either be provided with the requested transcript or 
the presumption should not be applied. 
2. The Idaho Supreme Court, By Failing To Provide Mr. Weathers With 
Access To The Reguested Transcripts Has Denied Him Due Process 
Because He Cannot Obtain Effective Assistance Of Counsel On Appeal 
In Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932), the Sixth Amendment right to counsel 
in the context of death penalty cases was selectively incorporated to the states through 
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution. In coming to this conclusion, the United State Supreme Court reasoned 
that the ability to be heard by counsel is so inextricably related to due process that the 
denial of counsel is tantamount to the denial of a hearing. Powell, 287 U.S. at 69. The 
Supreme Court also stated that under the facts of Powell "the necessity of counsel was 
so vital and imperative that the failure to make an effective appointment of counsel was 
likewise a denial of due process within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment ... 
[to] hold otherwise would be to ignore the fundamental postulate, already adverted to, 
'that there are certain immutable principles of justice which inhere in the very idea of 
free government which no member of the Union may disregard.'" Id. at 71-72. 
In Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963), the United States Supreme Court 
relied on Griffin, supra, and is progeny and determined that the Equal Protection Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment requires the states to provide indigent defendants the 
right to counsel on appeal. In Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387 (1985), the protection of 
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Douglas was extended to the right to effective assistance of counsel on appeal. 
According to the United States Supreme Court: 
In short, the promise of Douglas that a criminal defendant has a right to 
counsel on appeal-like the promise of Gideon that a criminal defendant 
has a right to counsel at trial would be a futile gesture unless it 
comprehended the right to effective assistance of counsel. 
Evitts, 469 U.S. at 397. 
The remaining issue is defining effective assistance of counsel. According to the 
United States Supreme Court, appellate counsel must make a conscientious 
examination of the case and file a brief in support of the best arguments to be made. 
Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967), held that the constitutional requirements 
of substantial equality and fair process "can only be attained where counsel acts as an 
active advocate on behalf of his client .... [Counsel's] role as advocate requires that he 
support his client's interest's to the best of his ability." See also Banuelos v. State, 127 
Idaho 860, 865 (Ct. App. 1995). In this case, the lack of access to the requested 
transcripts prevented appellate counsel from making a conscientious examination of the 
case and has potentially prevented appellate counsel from determining whether there is 
an additional issue to raise, or whether there is a factual support either in favor of any 
argument made or undercutting an argument. Therefore, Mr. Weathers has not 
obtained review of the court proceedings based on the merits and was not provided with 
effective assistance of counsel in that endeavor. 
Furthermore, in State v. Charboneau, 116 Idaho 129, 137 (1989) (overruled on 
other grounds by State v. Card, 121 Idaho 425 (1991)), the Idaho Supreme Court held 
that the starting point for evaluating whether counsel renders effective assistance of 
counsel in a criminal action is the American Bar Association, Standards For Criminal 
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Justice, The Defense Function. These standards offer insight into the role and 
responsibilities of appellate counsel. Regarding appellate counsel, the standards state: 
Appellate counsel should give a client his or her best professional 
evaluation of the questions that might be presented on appeal. Counsel, 
when inquiring into the case, should consider all issues that might affect 
the validity of the judgment of conviction and sentence . . .. Counsel 
should advise on the probable outcome of a challenge to the conviction or 
sentence. Counsel should endeavor to persuade the client to abandon a 
wholly frivolous appeal or to eliminate contentions lacking in substance. 
Standard 4-S.3(b). In the absence of access to the requested transcripts, appellate 
counsel can neither make a professional evaluation of the questions that might be 
presented on appeal, nor consider all issues that might have affected the district court's 
decision to revoke probation. Further, counsel is unable to advise Mr. Weathers on the 
probable role the transcripts may play in the appeal. 
Mr. Weathers is entitled to effective assistance of counsel in this appeal, and 
effective assistance cannot be given in the absence of access to the relevant 
transcripts. Therefore, the Idaho Supreme Court has denied Mr. Weathers his 
constitutional right to due process which includes a right to the effective assistance of 
counsel in this appeal. Accordingly, appellate counsel should be provided with access 
to the requested transcripts and should be allowed the opportunity to provide any 
necessary supplemental briefing raising issues which arise as a result of that review. 
II. 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Revoked Mr. Weathers' Probation 
Mr. Weathers asserts that, given any view of the facts, the district court abused 
its discretion when it revoked his probation. When a defendant appeals from an order 
revoking probation, the Idaho Court of Appeals has utilized the following framework: 
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The decision to revoke a defendant's probation on a suspended sentence 
is within the discretion of the district court. I.c. § 20-222. In a probation 
revocation proceeding, two threshold questions are posed: (1) did the 
probationer violate the terms of probation; and, if so, (2) should probation 
be revoked? State v. Case, 112 Idaho 1136 (Ct. App. 1987). 
State v. Corder, 115 Idaho 1137, 1138 (Ct. App. 1989). 
Mr. Weathers concedes that he violated the terms of his probation. (12/13/11 
Tr., p.166, L.24 - p.167, L.21.) Accordingly, he only contests the district court's 
decision to revoke his probation. "A district court's decision to revoke probation will not 
be overturned on appeal absent a showing that the court abused its discretion." State v. 
Sanchez, 149 Idaho 102, 105 (2009). "When a district court's discretionary decision is 
reviewed on appeal, the appellate court conducts a multi-tiered inquiry to determine 
whether the lower court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion, acted within 
the boundaries of such discretion and consistently with any legal standards applicable 
to the specific choices before it, and reached its decision by an exercise of reason." 
State v. Knutsen, 138 Idaho 918, 923 (Ct. App. 2003). "In deciding whether revocation 
of probation is the appropriate response to a violation, the court considers whether the 
probation is achieving the goal of rehabilitation and whether continued probation is 
consistent with the protection of society." State v. Leach, 135 Idaho 525, 529 (Ct. App. 
2001 ). 
There are mitigating explanations for some of Mr. Weathers' probation violations. 
Mr. Weathers did not drink alcohol when he went into the bar and was only there to help 
a friend get a car started so it could be moved. (01/18/12 Tr., pAO, L.3-18.) While 
Mr. Weathers was discharged from his sexual treatment, his treatment provider testified 
at the evidentiary hearing that Mr. Weathers did make progress concerning deviant 
sexual behavior. (01/18/12 Tr., pA2, L.12 - pA3, L.12.) Mr. Weathers did have 
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alternative sexual treatment options in the community. (01/18/12 Tr., p.39, L.12 - pAO, 
L.1.) Mr. Weathers had addressed his use of pornography through treatment prior to 
the probation violation disposition hearing. (01/18/12 Tr., pAO, L.24 - pA2, L.18.) 
While on probation, Mr. Weathers did not engaged in any activity related to the 
underlying offense. According to trial counsel: 
As the Court will know, the underlying offense was ... deviant 
sexual behavior with an underage child. There is no evidence and no 
testimony and no allegations that Mr. Weathers has engaged in any of that 
type of sexual deviancy, seeking out minors, putting himself in locations 
with minors. And my recollection is the pornography was heterosexual 
materials, not child pornography. 
We have nothing to support that Mr. Weathers has in any way[,]since 
being placed back on probation[,] initiated . . . sexual deviant behavior 
associated with minors. There is nothing. 
(01/18/12 Tr., pA6, L.7 - pA7, L.1.) 
In sum, Mr. Weathers' probation violations are insignificant when compared to 
the underlying offense. Mr. Weathers' probation was protecting society because he did 
not engage in any behavior while on probation remotely related to the underlying 
offense. Moreover, his probation was serving the purpose of rehabilitation because he 
was advancing in his treatment. Therefore, the district court abused its discretion when 
it revoked probation. 
III. 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Failed To Reduce Mr. Weathers' 
Sentences, Sua Sponte Upon Revoking Probation 
Mr. Weathers asserts that, given any view of the facts, his unified sentence of 
seven years, with three years fixed, is excessive. Due to the district court's power 
under I.C.R. 35 to reduce the length of the original sentence sua sponte upon the 
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revocation of probation, on appeal an appellant can challenge the length of the 
sentence as being excessive. State v. Jensen, 138 Idaho 941, 944 (Ct. App. 2003). 
Where a defendant contends that the sentencing court imposed an excessively harsh 
sentence, the appellate court will conduct an independent review of the record giving 
consideration to the nature of the offense, the character of the offender, and the 
protection of the public interest. See State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771 (Ct. App. 1982). 
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, '''[w]here a sentence is within statutory 
limits, an appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of 
the court imposing the sentence.'" State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997) 
(quoting State v. Cotton, 100 Idaho 573, 577 (1979)). Mr. Weathers does not allege 
that his sentence exceeds the statutory maximum. Accordingly, in order to show an 
abuse of discretion, Mr. Weathers must show that in light of the governing criteria, the 
sentence was excessive considering any view of the facts. Id. The governing criteria, 
or objectives of criminal punishment are: (1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of the 
individual and the public generally; (3) the possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) 
punishment or retribution for wrongdoing. Id. 
As a preliminary matter, Mr. Weathers incorporates the arguments made in 
section II, supra, herein by reference thereto. 
There are various mitigating factors present in this matter which support the 
conclusion that Mr. Weathers' sentence is unduly harsh. Specifically, Mr. Weathers' 
psychosexual evaluation concluded that he has a moderate to low recidivism risk. 
(Psychosexual Evaluation, p.12.) As stated in section II, supra, Mr. Weathers had not 
engaged in any behavior while on probation which would indicate that his risk to 
reoffend had increased. 
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Mr. Weathers has a positive employment history as a professional truck driver. 
(07/13/09 Tr., p.18, Ls.8-17.) At one point in time he owed approximately $27,000.00 in 
child support payments. (07/13/09 Tr., p.11, Ls.20-23.) However, at the time of 
sentencing he had reduced that amount to approximately $7,000.00, which evinces a 
significant level of personal responsibility. (07/13/09 Tr., p.11, L.24 - p.12, L.3.) 
While Mr. Weathers does have prior felonies, those occurred when he was in his 
early twenties and approximately fifteen years before the instant offense. (07/13/09 
Tr., p.19, Ls.12-21.) Further, the instant offense is Mr. Weathers' only sex-related 
offense. (07/13/09 Tr., p.19, Ls.22-24.) 
Mr. Weathers apologized to the victim and her family. (07/13/09 Tr., p.32, LS.10-
14, p.33, Ls.13-15.) Mr. Weathers also expressed his remorse for the negative 
consequences his actions had on his own family. (07/13/09 Tr., p.32, Ls.21-24.) 
In sum, Mr. Weathers' sentence is excessively harsh when viewed in light of the 
mitigating factors present in this matter. 
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CONCLUSION 
Appellate counsel respectfully requests access to the requested transcripts and 
the opportunity to provide any necessary supplemental briefing raising issues which 
arise as a result of that review. In the event this request is denied, Mr. Weathers 
respectfully requests that this Court remand this matter with an instruction to place him 
on probation. Alternatively, Mr. Weathers respectfully requests that this Court reduce 
the length of the fixed portion of his sentence. Alternatively, Mr. Weathers respectfully 
requests that this Court reduce the length of his sentence as it deems appropriate. 
DATED this 24th day of October, 2012. 
SHAWN F. WILKERSON 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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